We consider a model where a monopolist can profile consumers in order to price discriminate among them, and consumers can take costly actions to protect their identities and make the profiling technology less effective. A novel aspect of the model consists in the profiling technology: the signal that the monopolist gets about a consumer's willingness-to-pay can be made more accurate either by having more consumers revealing their identities, or by spending larger amounts of money on third-party complementary data or data analytics capabilities. We show that the optimal investment level from the monopolist is closely related to the flexibility of consumers to conceal their identities as well as to data requirements. In particular, a higher (lower) data requirement is an instance when more (less) consumers are required to achieve the same signal precision. For a given data requirement, we show that a smaller investment is required to achieve the same level of accuracy when it gets more difficult for consumers to conceal their identities, leading to a higher profit for the firm. Consumer surplus and social welfare are instead non-monotone in the ability of consumers to conceal their identities. Surprisingly, the firm's investment is not monotone in the level of data requirement, where investment is the greatest when data requirement is moderate. We also show that the monopolist has a tendency to invest excessively. This inefficiency is particularly acute either when the firm needs many profiled consumers in the dataset to be precise ("big data") and the action for consumers to protect their identities is costly, or when the firm can profile consumers effectively with only a few of them ("small data") and the cost of consumers' identification concealing is moderate.
Introduction
The explosion of information technologies has provided unprecedented ways for firms to collect data about their consumers. For instance, communications between web browsers and web sites allow firms to gather information including IP address, the web browser type, the computer model, as well as its operating system -all of which can be used in consumer profiling. Web sites can also assign and read unique identifiers, called cookies, which are used to compile records of individuals' 1 browsing histories. Retail web sites like Amazon use cookies to keep track of what a consumer has shopped for and bought, and tailor web sites with products that the firm suspects that the consumer is the most interested in. Apple's iBeacon is a Near Field Communications technology that allows mobile Apps to collect a consumer's position on a micro-local scale, and deliver hyper-contextual content to users based on his/her location in real time.
1 Dansk Supermarked, Denmark's largest supermarket chain, partnered with Infosys -a leading IT consulting company -in order to use address data of its repeated consumers and tailor offers of products relevant to where they live.
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All these examples demonstrate that technological developments have enhanced a firm's ability to profile consumers and price discriminate among them.
On the other hand, consumers have become more wary with respect to how their information is being collected and used by firms. Singer (2015) reports several instances where consumers are aware of the many trade-offs associated with giving companies access to their data. Ultimately, the data can be supplied only by consumers themselves. The very same technologies that allow a firm to profile, can also be used by consumers to counteract the effectiveness of profiling. Consumers can delete all cookies, block third-party cookies, or purge cookie files. Some privacy-wary consumers even take further steps and pay third parties to protect their data. For example, Reputation.com charges individuals $9.95 per month to remove personal data from on-line data markets.
Drawing upon this increasing tension between firms and consumers, we study data profiling in the context of price discrimination. While a large literature has analyzed consumer profiling and price targeting, which we review in Section 2, in this paper we consider the novel aspect of the accuracy of profiling. There are two entangled premises of our model, one related to actions that can be taken by the firm (data precision) and one related to actions that can be taken by consumers (data protection).
The degree of precision of consumer's information is an endogenous choice of the firm. Precision can be improved in two complementary ways. One way is to gather a dataset about the firm's own consumers. The precision of the information that can be extracted directly from own consumers depends on the consumers' sample size. Norvig (2010) suggests that the relationship between the quality of the information and the amount of data available is S-shaped, and the scale of data needs to reach a minimal threshold, depending on applications, to be sufficiently informative.
Hence, there are situations when only "small data" are enough to generate statistically-relevant information about consumers, as opposed to truly "big data" instances whereby databases should 3 include abundant information from many consumers. A way to think about a small-data case is one where there is a relatively simple and general statistical relationship in the population of consumers based on a few observables (think of gender and age, for instance). A few hundreds observations may suffice for the firm to unravel the relationship and understand its consumers with a very good degree of precision. Conversely, a situation about big data is one where there could be thousands of profiles, and the data requirements are orders of magnitude larger.
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Another way to improve precision is to invest resources in either acquiring data from third parties to complement the dataset about own consumers, or data analysts and technologies to support them. A larger investment would correspond with an increase in the precision of consumers' information that one can potential extract from the dataset about own consumers. For instance, consider loyalty programs adopted by firms in a wide range of industries, including grocery retailing.
Supermarkets not only collect information directly from their consumers, but also often supplement their consumer data by spending money on data collected from other sources, such as electoral rolls and credit reports. Tesco was the first UK supermarket to launch a loyalty scheme dated back to 1995. Later on, Tesco matched its own data with data from other sources, and created Crucible, a lucrative venture set up to allow other commercial organizations to pay for access to Tesco's data.
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While these two channels are both relevant and fit the purpose of improving the precision of the signal received about a consumer, they exhibit different features and therefore it is important to keep a distinction between them. Own data are likely to be idiosyncratic to the firm, and therefore more directly relevant, ceteris paribus. Instead, data acquired from third parties (or investment in data analytics capabilities) are more akin to a general-purpose technology. This distinction plays an important role when it comes to the modelling as shown later in the paper.
Turning to the second aspect of our model, consumers make endogenous choices whether to allow the firm to use information about them. A consumer can take a costly action to conceal his/her identity. This opens various interesting aspects that we contemplate. First, related to the point about sample size and accuracy, the firm needs to make sure that consumers endogenously prefer not to conceal their identities -otherwise the profile techniques will be ineffective. This can be done either by offering them a good price in case they allow data disclosure, or by penalizing them in case they do not. Second, as information concealing is costly, there are welfare and policy questions arising. Regulators could make the cost of concealing smaller, for instance by imposing a full disclosure policy on the use of cookies. Conversely, this cost could be made larger if the firms are allowed to trade consumers' data, so that consumers would need to request potentially many websites to erase their data. Hence we can also address, in a meaningful way, the question that is at the core of current debate on consumer privacy. How easy should access to consumers' information be?
Taking into account the factors described above, in this paper we consider a model where a monopolist seeks to price discriminate consumers through data profiling. Consumers can take costly actions to protect their identities. Otherwise, a signal about a consumer's willingness-to-pay is received by the firm. The signal can be made more accurate either by having more consumers revealing their identities, or by investing larger amounts of money on third-party data or data analytics capabilities. We characterize the equilibrium outcome of this game. It turns out that the firm needs to strike a delicate balance when it comes to the investment decision. A higher investment allows the firm to derive more accurate signals, given the same number of consumers in the database. At the same time, consumers are wary of the investment from the firm, and thus a larger fraction of them lean toward being anonymous. The optimal investment level is closely related to the ability of consumers to conceal their identities as well as to data requirements. In particular, we define a higher (lower) data requirement as an instance when more (less) consumers are required to achieve the same signal precision, given the same investment from the monopolist.
Under the same data requirement, we show that a smaller investment is required to achieve the same level of accuracy as it gets more difficult for consumers to conceal their identities, leading to a higher profit for the firm. On the other hand, consumer surplus and social welfare are non-monotone in the ability of consumers to conceal their identities.
Surprisingly, the firm's investment is not monotone in the level of data requirement, where investment is the greatest when data requirement is moderate. The rationale behind this phenomenon is the following. When the data requirement is low, a small investment is sufficient for the firm to profile consumers with good accuracy, and thus the optimal investment from the firm tends to be small. As data requirement increases, the firm generally increases its investment level with the hope of getting more accurate signals from consumers. At the same time, the fraction of consumers who choose to reveal their identities decreases. Consequently, when the data requirement is sufficiently high, even a high investment would not allow the firm to profile consumers accurately due to the lack of the scale of data, leading the firm to scale back its optimal investment level. We also show that the monopolist has a tendency to invest excessively. This inefficiency is particularly acute when either the firm needs many profiled consumers in the dataset to be precise and the action for consumers to protect their identities is costly, or the firm can profile consumers effectively with only a few of them and the cost of consumers' identification concealing is moderate.
Literature Review
Our paper relates to two broad streams in the literature. First, our paper is linked to the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. In the seminal work by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , they study the effects of behavior-based price competition in the framework of a two-period Hotelling model. Firms are able to profile a consumer's preference on the Hotelling line based upon his/her purchase decision in the first period. Past behavior is then used in the second period to design a discriminatory pricing scheme by the firm. The research on behavior-based pricing has been extended to various settings and applications (Villas-Boas 1999 , Villas-Boas 2004 , Pazgal and Soberman 2008 , Chen and Zhang 2009 , Shin and Sudhir 2010 , Zhang 2011 . 5 Comprehensive literature reviews can be found in Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009) . Most of the literature on behavior-based price discrimination assumes a multi-period setting where the firms price discriminate consumers based on their purchase history. We abstract away from this by proposing a simpler single-period model that still generates a meaningful way to have targeted and non-targeted prices.
Essentially, there are some consumers (that we call the "old" market, as long as they do not not protect their privacy) for whom targeting is possible, and then there is an anonymous market, which can be composed by "new" consumers to the firm as well as by those repeated consumers who conceal/erase their data, such that the firm is not able to identify them. This feature is shared with Montes et al. (2015) who study a different question of data intermediaries. Our paper also distinguishes from this stream of the literature in that consumers' privacy decisions are endogenous in our model.
Second, there is a stream of literature that examines the implications of consumer privacy explicitly. Similar to the literature on behavior-based price discrimination, the majority of this stream of literature studies pricing and privacy regulation, as well as their implications and consequences on welfare, while assuming that consumers' privacy decisions are exogenously determined (Taylor 2004 , Acquisti and Varian 2005 , Taylor and Wagman 2014 , Bergemann and Bonatti 2015 , Shy and Stenbacka 2016 . Acquisti et al. (2015) present an updated literature review of this literature.
A growing number of contributions have considered the implications of consumers' endogenous decisions regarding how much information to be revealed to the firm. Conitzer et al. (2012) study a monopolist's pricing problem in the framework of a two-period model, where consumers have an 6 option of maintaining anonymity at the end of first period. They show that consumers benefit from an increase in the cost of anonymity, up to a certain point. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) consider a duopoly setting where consumers can choose the amount of information being provided to the firms. This information can help the firms to improve the quality of their products.
Firms derive revenues from both consumer purchases and disclosure of consumer information in a secondary market. Montes et al. (2015) study the effects of price discrimination with endogenous consumers' privacy choices in the context of a duopoly Hotelling model. There is a data broker who collects consumers' information and can sell data to the two competing sellers. They show that the optimal selling strategy for the owner of consumer data is to deal with one firm exclusively.
All these papers assume a perfect profiling technology where the exact valuation or preference of a consumer can be inferred by the firms.
There are two works that are closest related to ours in that the profiling technology is assumed to be imperfect. In Koh et al. (2015) consumers can choose to disclose their private information to a monopolist in return for reduced search cost due to more accurate product recommendation. They face a trade-off between better product-fit and potential price discrimination. Belleflamme (2015) studies the optimal pricing of a monopolist who is able profile consumers, while consumers are able to counteract by maintaining anonymity. What these two models have in common is that the signal received by the firm is assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution when a consumer's true valuation is revealed with probability β, and no new information with probability (1 − β). Our work differs from these papers in two important aspects. First, in our paper, the firm makes an endogenous and costly investment in the precision of the signal, whereas the profiling technology is exogenously given in Koh et al. (2015) and Belleflamme (2015) . Coupled with the fact that consumers choose endogenously whether or not to reveal information, we add an important dimension related to privacy costs and privacy protection, allowing us to have a significant welfare discussion. Second, we further expand on the profiling technology by considering two distinct scenarios, namely investment in a general purpose technology, which is independent of consumer base size, and investment that depends on data requirements, where there exists externality in the size of the dataset. We then derive managerial implications on when/how/why a firm should invest in profiling technology.
The Model

The Setup
A monopolist sells a product to a continuum of consumers with a total mass of one. There are two market segments, namely an "old market" and a "new market". The difference is that nothing is known about consumers in the new market, while information can be obtained about consumers in the old market. Assume that the size of the old market is λ, and the size of the new market is 1 − λ. In the following analysis, we use the subscripts o and n to denote the old market and the new market, respectively. As discussed in the previous section, most of the literature on behavior-based price discrimination assumes a multi-period setting where the firms price discriminate consumers based on their purchase history. We abstract away from this by using the "old" vs "new" markets as a simple but flexible device to model different segments of consumers. These two markets are described next.
A consumer's valuation in the old (new) market is determined by the realization of a random variable, which follows a cumulative distribution function
normalized to be the unit interval, and is assumed to be smooth, with strictly positive density
A consumer in the old market can choose to conceal his identity to prevent the firm from profiling his valuation towards the product. A cost of c (≥ 0) is incurred if a consumer spends the effort to conceal his identity.
The firm invests a total amount of K in collecting old consumers' information and profiling consumers. The investment in consumer profiling allows the firm to receive a signal for each consumer in the old market who reveals his identity. Following the discussion in Section 1, the accuracy of the signal is dependent on the firm's investment K, as well as on the fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities, γ. More accurate signals are received with a higher investment K. The firm is also able to get a more accurate signal with a greater proportion of old consumers γ who choose to reveal their valuations, which constitute the dataset that can be analyzed with statistical techniques. As a result, there exist externalities in consumer profiling, because a consumer's decision of revealing his identity has implications for the rest of consumers in the dataset. No profiling can instead be conducted in the new market.
Denote by s the random signal the firm receives for an old consumer if he chooses to reveal his identity. Let G(s|v) be the conditional cumulative distribution of signals from a type-v consumer.
Notice that G(s|v) depends on K and γ, but we omit them to simply the notations. Its corresponding density function is denoted as g(s|v). We make the following assumption on the conditional distribution of signals.
The monotonicity in likelihood ratio is a refinement of the concept of first-order stochastic dominance. This assumption implies that G(s|v 1 ) ≤ G(s|v 2 ), ∀ v 1 ≥ v 2 , i.e., signals generated by a consumer with a higher valuation dominate signals generated by a consumer with a lower valuation in the sense of the first-order stochastic dominance. As we will show below, this assumption guarantees that there exists a cutoffṽ such that any consumer with a valuation greater thanṽ would choose to conceal, and any consumer with a valuation less thanṽ would choose to reveal in the old market.
The game unfolds in several stages. First, each consumer realizes his valuation, v, on the unit interval. The firm does not observe v; however, the distribution F i (v), i = o, n, is common knowledge, known to both the firm and consumers. Second, the firm decides an investment level K in consumer profiling. In the third stage, each consumer in the old market decides whether or not to conceal his identity. A cost of c is incurred when concealing his identity. Next, the firm sets a base price to consumers in the new market, as well as to those in the old market who conceal their identities. The firm also offers a tailored price to each consumer in the old market who chooses to reveal his identity, based on the firm's belief of the consumer's valuation. Finally, each consumer makes the purchase decision, and he will purchase the product if and only if his utility from purchasing the product is non-negative.
Preliminary Results
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as the solution concept. For a consumer in the new market, the only decision he has to make is whether or not to purchase the product in the last stage. For a type-v consumer, he will purchase the product if and only if his utility from purchasing is greater than or equal to zero, i.e., u n (v) = v − p ≥ 0, where p is the price charged to anonymous consumers.
In the old market, a type-v consumer's expected utility from concealing his identity is
The expected utility for a type-v consumer if he chooses to reveal his identity is given by
, where p(s) is the price the firm charges upon receiving a signal s. Assume that if a consumer is indifferent between revealing or concealing, he would choose to save the effort and simply reveal his identity. Consequently, a consumer with valuation v would choose to conceal his identity if and only if
We focus on the equilibrium where there is a cutoffṽ, such that all consumers in the old market with v >ṽ choose to conceal, and all consumers with v <ṽ choose to reveal. The existence of such cutoff is guaranteed by Assumption 1 as the signal from a consumer with a higher valuation dominates that of a consumer with a lower valuation in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (see Lemma 1 below). The cutoff is given byṽ = inf{v
Suppose that E[p(s)|v] is continuous in v. Given a cutoffṽ, the firm's belief of the valuation of a consumer in the old market who chooses to conceal his identity is given by
The firm's belief of a consumer's valuation upon receiving a signal s is given by
where its corresponding cumulative distribution is denoted as H(v|s). The following lemma is a direct consequence of Assumption 1 and properties of monotone likelihood ratio.
.
In the remainder, we assume that consumers' valuations are uniformly distributed in both the new market and the old market. The firm's belief of the valuation of a consumer in the old market who chooses to conceal his identity can be simplified as
Consumers in the new market and those consumers in the old market who conceal their identities, such that the firm is not able to identify them, constitute an anonymous market. The firm's expected revenue from charging a price p to those anonymous consumers, from both the old market and the new market, is given by
and thus the optimal price that maximizes the firm's profit is given by
subject to the constraint thatṽ − p * (ṽ) − c ≥ 0. Otherwise the type-(ṽ + ) consumer, for any small > 0, is always better-off revealing his identity and receives a non-negative expected utility. Equation (2) has a simple interpretation. Because the average valuation in the anonymous market is greater than that in the new market, p * (ṽ) is always above the standard monopoly price
(1/2), ifṽ < 1. Ifṽ = 1, no one in the old market conceals, and the firm faces two identical markets.
The indifferent type in the new market is given by v n = p * (ṽ), which must be between 0 and 1.
Simplifying the preceding two constraints yields thatṽ ≥
for the existence of a separating equilibrium, where some consumers in the old market choose to reveal their identities and others choose to conceal their identities, is given by 1 ≥
, which is equivalent to c ≤ 1/2. We assume that this inequality holds throughout the following analysis.
Formalization of Signal Accuracy
Next we formalize the definition of accuracy of signals. In particular, we assume that the conditional density of signals from a type-v consumer follows the specification below. For any α K,γ > 0,
That is, the conditional distribution of signals still follows a uniform distribution. The signal s degenerates to a constant of v, if α K,γ = 0. It is easy to verify that our specification of g (s|v) satisfies Assumption 1. The mean of random signals equals to the consumer's valuation v, which is independent of the firm's investment as well as others' decisions. However, the conditional distribution rotates around the mean v as K and γ varies. 6 Consequently, the accuracy of the signal is determined solely by α K,γ . To reflect our assumption that the firm gets a more accurate signal with either a higher investment K, or a greater proportion of consumers γ choosing to reveal their valuations, we assume that α K,γ is weakly decreasing in K and γ. 
α as a Step Function
We first consider the case where α K,γ follows a step function as specified below. A more general specification of signals is considered in Section 5.
That is, for a given fraction of consumers who choose to reveal their identities γ, if the investment from the firm is less than τ (γ), the firm is not able to gain any extra information by profiling those consumers. On the other hand, the firm is able to perfectly profile those consumers who reveal their identities and knows their valuations, if the firm's investment reaches the threshold τ (γ).
We assume that τ (γ) is non-increasing and concave in γ. The non-increasing property of τ (·) is consistent with the intuition that the firm's investment required to profile consumers perfectly decreases (weakly) in the fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities. The concavity of τ (·) suggests that the required investment level decreases slowly when γ is small, however the marginal effect of the size of dataset on the required investment increases when the dataset becomes larger. It is motivated by the "data threshold" commonly observed in practice (Norvig 2010) . We also assume that τ (1) > 0, i.e., under the situation when all consumers choose to reveal their identities, the firm still needs to commit a certain level of investment in order to profile the consumers perfectly. We will often work with the inverse function. If the firm's investment is K, the minimal fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities that allows the firm to perfectly profile consumers' valuations is given by τ −1 (K).
Characterization of Equilibrium
With α K,γ being a step function as specified in Equation (3), consumers' behavior in the old market can be characterized by the lemma below.
Lemma 2. (Profiling with α K,γ being a step-function) 
Consumers' optimal responses under various firm's investment levels are illustrated in Figure 2 .
Recall that a consumer from the old market needs to spend effort c in order to conceal his identity.
Intuitively, any consumer with a valuation lower than c would find it unattractive to conceal his identity, and choose to simply reveal his identity. However, as shown in Lemma 2, the fraction of consumers who are guaranteed to reveal their identities is given by
which is (1 − λc)/(2 − λ) higher than c. Consequently, as long as the firm is able to commit an investment level of at least
, it would gather sufficient data to profile consumers perfectly.
On the other hand, when the firm's investment K is less than K o , due to the fact that consumers would get zero surplus if the firm is able to profile them perfectly, consumers will thus coordinate such that the fraction of consumers that choose to reveal their identities is less than τ −1 (K). (2−λ) 2 ≥ 0, where the first inequality is due to λ ≤ 1, and the second inequality is due to our assumption that c ≤ 1/2. Combining preceding results with the monotonicity of τ (γ), we can establish the monotonicity of K o , which is summarized in the corollary below.
Note, in particular, that the required level of investment to perfectly profile consumers K o is non-increasing in the cost of concealing c. This is intuitive because more consumers would find concealing their identities unattractive with a higher c. The effect of the market composition is more nuanced. In the old market, only those consumers with relatively high valuations would choose to conceal their identities. Thus, if a larger proportion of consumers come from the old market, 13 the profit-maximizing firm would charge a higher price to anonymous consumers, which dissuades consumers in the old market from concealing their identities, allowing the firm to get away with a lower investment level.
Next we study the firm's optimal investment level in the first stage. When the firm's investment level K is greater than or equal to K o , any consumer in the old market with a valuation greater than v o would choose to conceal his identity. Consequently, the optimal price the firm charges to those anonymous consumers in both old and new markets is given by
and thus the firm's optimal profit with an investment of K is given by
As indicated by the profit function, any investment beyond K o does not yield any extra revenue, because the firm can already profile consumers perfectly with an investment of K o , and the fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities remain the same. On the other hand, when K < K o , the optimal price the firm charges to those anonymous consumers, according to Equation (2), is given by
and the firm's optimal profit, for any
When K < τ (1), the firm is not able to gain any information from profiling even if all consumers in the old market choose to reveal their identities. Thus, all consumers in the old market would be better-off revealing their identities, and the firm obtains the optimal profit with a zero investment,
). Under the assumption that τ (·) is a concave function, the firm's optimal investment level is characterized by the lemma below. fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities, the optimal solution is to either invest the minimum amount K o that allows the firm to profile consumers perfectly, or not to invest in consumer profiling at all. With an investment of K o , the firm's optimal expected profit is given by
and λc 2 (1−λ) 2−λ > 0, we obtain that the revenue from investing K o is always greater than 1/4. As a result, the firm's decision on investing in consumer profiling depends ultimately on whether the increase in revenue outweighs the cost of profiling consumers.
Welfare Implications
Interestingly, whether or not the firm chooses to invest has different implications on consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare (SW). With an investment of K o , consumer surplus and social welfare are given by
Similarly, with a zero investment, consumer surplus and social welfare are given by
Neither λ nor c plays a role in consumer surplus or social welfare when the firm invests 0. The reason is that with no investment from the firm, the signal from a consumer is non-informative.
That is, the firm's posterior belief of a consumer's valuation is exactly the same as the prior belief.
Consequently, any consumer in the old market would be better off revealing his identity, and the firm faces two identical markets in terms of the distribution of consumer valuations. However, if the firm invests, prices will differ and thus both λ and c affect the equilibrium. The impacts of λ and c on profit and consumer surplus are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 4. (Structural Properties)
(i) π Ko (λ, c) is increasing in both λ and c;
(ii) CS Ko (λ, c) is decreasing in λ, and is convex in c;
(iii) SW Ko (λ, c) is convex in both λ and c.
A direct consequence of Lemma 4(i) is that the firm is more likely to invest in consumer profiling with either a higher c or a higher λ. The rationale behind this is that the firm's profit with zero investment is given by π 0 (λ, c) = 1/4, which is independent of both c and γ. On the other hand, the firm's profit from investing K o is increasing in c and γ, and its maximum is realized at
. Consequently, when τ (1) ≤ 1/4, the firm would prefer investing in consumer profiling over no investment if and only if λ and c are sufficiently high. We summarize the result in the corollary below. (ii) when τ (1) ≤ 1/4, the firm is more likely to make an investment of K o with a higher c and/or a higher λ.
With a zero investment in consumer profiling, the firm is able to profile a consumer only to the granularity of markets, i.e., whether a consumer comes from the old market or the new market.
Consequently, the firm could potentially utilize the information, and offer prices tailored to the two markets. Arguably in our model, the benefit from this third-degree price discrimination does not arise due to the assumption of identical valuation distribution across the two markets. The benefit of investing K o comes from knowing the exact valuation of every single consumer who chooses to reveal his identity in the old market, thus allowing the firm to offer a tailored price to each individual consumer. For a fixed investment, the fraction of consumers who choose to reveal their identities will be greater with a greater c or a greater γ, and thus the option of perfect profiling becomes more attractive.
The impacts of profiling on consumer surplus and social welfare are summarized in the corollary below.
Corollary 3. (Impact of Profiling on Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare)
Comparing consumer surplus and social welfare under investment levels of 0 and K o , we have (i) for any λ and c, CS Ko (λ, c) ≤ CS 0 (λ, c);
(ii) for any λ > 1/4 and c, SW Ko (λ, c) ≥ SW 0 (λ, c) when K o is sufficiently small.
It is not surprising that investment in profiling enables the firm to capture more consumer surplus than it would otherwise without the investment. However, this investment is not necessarily socially optimal. If the firm chooses to invest in profiling consumers, the firm is able to sell to more consumers in the old market, especially to those with relatively low valuations due to personalized pricing. This is good for efficiency. At the same time, consumers with higher valuations would choose to spend the effort to avoid price discrimination from the firm, leading to a loss in efficiency.
Consequently, if the size of the old market is small, or the investment required to profile consumers perfectly, i.e., K o , is high, investment leads to a suboptimal situation from the perspective of social welfare.
Having described how the equilibrium looks like, and having identified possible inefficiencies, we now ask a natural follow up and central question. What determines the extent to which the investment is socially optimal? Imagine a situation where prices to consumers are always set by the firm, but the investment level could be set by a social planner that maximizes total welfare instead of just the firm's profit. How does the investment level compare to that chosen by the firm? It turns out that whether the firm's investment is socially optimal depends critically on the function τ (·), which determines the amount of investment required to perfectly profile consumers who choose to reveal their identities, i.e., K o . If the investment function τ (·) evaluated at v o is greater than an upper threshold K λ,c , then it would be prohibitive for the firm to invest, and this decision turns out to be efficient. On the other end of the spectrum, if the amount of investment required is less than a lower threshold K λ,c , the firm prefers to invest in profiling consumers' valuations, and the increase in the sales outweighs the cost of investment K o and the amount of effort consumers spend to conceal their identities, leading to a socially-optimal investment decision. However, for moderate
, the firm makes an excessive investment from the perspective of social welfare.
Proposition 1. (Optimal Investment vs. Excessive Investment)
, the firm does not invest in consumer profiling, and this decision is socially optimal;
(ii) when K λ,c < K o ≤ K λ,c , the firm invests K o in consumer profiling, which leads to excessive investment from the perspective of social welfare;
(iii) when K o ≤ K λ,c , the firm invests K o in consumer profiling, and this decision is also socially optimal;
where K λ,c = 1 2(2−λ)
and K λ,c = 1 8
A direct consequence of Proposition 1, as shown in Corollary 4(i) below, is that the interval where the firm's investment is inefficient becomes larger for a relatively larger old market. That is, when the size of the old market is large, the option of knowing consumers' valuations perfectly becomes more attractive for the firm because the firm is able to price discriminate a larger fraction of the market. Consequently, the chance of excessive investment becomes higher, especially when the investment required is high. a policy maker that promotes total welfare (rather than consumer surplus alone) should make data protection very costly, because this minimizes the probability that inefficiencies could arise.
However, this is true only if the policy maker can affect the entire range of values of c, which may not be realistic. Often only piecemeal policy changes are implementable, and thus the policy maker could only affect privacy costs incrementally. Corollary 4(ii) shows that the inefficiency interval is non-monotonic in c: starting from a regime with very easy data protection (low c), making data protection a bit more costly for consumers would actually worsen total welfare.
Impact of Data Requirements
The final step in this section concerns the properties of the sampling technology that is used to profile consumers. We study how the firm's investment decision and profit will be affected by the different scenarios with respect to data requirement. The definition below sets the stage for our discussion. In particular, we say one scenario τ 1 indicates higher data requirement than another
That is, with the same investment from the firm, a larger fraction of consumers is required in order to profile their valuations perfectly under τ 1 than that under τ 2 . An alternative way to interpret the definition is that, for the same fraction of consumers who reveal their identities, a higher investment is needed from the firm under τ 1 to profile consumers perfectly.
Definition 1. (Higher Data Requirement)
For two functions τ 1 and τ 2 , τ 1 represents a scenario with higher data requirement than τ 2 if τ 1 (γ) ≥ τ 2 (γ), ∀ γ ∈ [0, 1] and the inequality is strict for some γ.
The implications of higher data requirement on the firm's profit, consumer surplus and social welfare are summarized in the proposition below. Because, given the same fraction of consumers who choose to reveal their identities, the amount of investment required is lower with lower data requirement, the firm is more likely to invest in consumer profiling, and the firm's profit is always higher under a scenario with lower data requirement. On the other hand, because the firm's investment always leads to lower consumer surplus as shown in Corollary 3, consumer surplus is thus lower when the data requirement is lower.
Proposition 2. (Impact of Data Requirement) Consider two scenarios τ 1 and τ 2 , where τ 1 indicates higher data requirement. Then, (i) the firm is more likely to invest in profiling under τ 2 , and the firm's optimal profit is also higher under τ 2 ;
(ii) consumer surplus is (weakly) lower under τ 2 ;
(iii) with small λ and c, the firm's investment decision is socially optimal under both scenarios;
with large λ and c, the firm's investment decision is more likely to be efficient under τ 2 ; with moderate λ and c, the firm's investment decision is more likely to be efficient under τ 1 .
The impact of data requirement on social welfare is the most involved and deserves further comment. Recall that the firm's profit when investing in consumer profiling is always increasing in λ and c. Consequently, with small λ and c, the firm does not invest under either a high-datarequirement scenario or a low-data-requirement scenario, and the firm's decision is efficient under both scenarios. With large λ and c, the firm invests under both scenarios, and its investment decision is more likely to be socially optimal under a scenario with lower data requirement due to the lower amount of investment required. With moderate λ and c, the firm will invest when the data requirement is low, but does not invest otherwise. In this case, the decision of no investment under high data requirement is guaranteed to be efficient, while the decision of investment may be excessive if the condition shown in Proposition 1(ii) is satisfied. As a result, higher data requirements may be beneficial to the entire society through dissuading the firm from unnecessary investment in profiling.
Proposition 2 indicates that efficiency of the firm's investment depends on not only the market composition λ and consumers' flexibility in concealing their identities c, but also data requirements.
Under the circumstances when the data requirement is low, policy makers can potentially increase consumers' cost of concealing their identities such that the firm's interest is better aligned with social welfare. On the other hand, under the scenario with big data, where a large fraction of consumers are required for the firm to profile them to a good extent, increasing consumers' flexibility in concealing their identities increases the chance that the firm's decision is also socially optimal.
α as a General (Logistic) Function
We managed to get several interesting insights analytically in the previous section, but arguably in a rather special case, where the signal accuracy is modelled by a step function. We further generalize our findings in this section by employing a flexible logistic specification for α K,γ , which is given by
where a ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0. It is easy to verify that the general α K,γ given by Equation (8) is decreasing in γ and K, which is consistent with our assumption that more accurate signals are received with a higher investment K or a greater proportion of consumers γ who choose to reveal their valuations.
When a → ∞, α K,γ degenerates to a step function. Consequently, studying this general α K,γ allows us to verify our findings from the special case, as well as explore the regimes that would be infeasible under the special case. The logistic specification generalizes the relationship between the amount of data and the quality of signals with an S-shaped curve, which is consistent with the idea pioneered by Peter Norvig (Director of Research at Google) as described in Section 1. That is, there exist "data thresholds" above which the quality of signals one can potentially extract from the data improves dramatically.
We further illustrate the shape of α K,γ with different parameters in Figure 3 . 
Characterization of Equilibrium
Under the general α K,γ , we can derive the firm's belief of the valuation of a consumer upon receiving a signal s from Equation (1), which is given by
for any v ∈ [max{s − α K,γ , 0}, min{s + α K,γ ,ṽ}]. The firm's posterior belief is uniformly distributed and centred around the signal s. The range of posterior valuations is narrower for the extreme signal values, i.e., when s is close to 0 orṽ. This is consistent with the intuition that the firm is able to profile those consumers with extreme valuations more accurately.
Consequently, the firm's expected revenue from charging price p to a consumer with signal s is
It is easy to verify that the optimal price p(s) that maximizes the firm's expected revenue is given by p(s) = max max{s − α K,γ , 0}, min{s + α K,γ ,ṽ} 2 .
The optimal expected revenue from a consumer with signal s is π * s = π s (p(s)). Similarly, the expected consumer surplus when the firm charges p(s) to a consumer with signal s is given by
The price the firm charges those anonymous consumers remains the same as before, which is given by Equation (2). Given p(s) and p * (ṽ), we next derive the fraction of consumers in the old market who choose to reveal their identities at equilibrium. Consider theṽ-type consumer. As s + α K,γ ≥ṽ,
Consequently, the expected price for aṽ-type consumer if he chooses to reveal his identity is
Recall thatṽ is given by
and whenṽ ≥ 4α K,γ ,ṽ is given byṽ
Givenṽ, the firm's profit from investing K can thus be written as
where the first term and the second term on the right hand side of the equation indicate revenue from those anonymous consumers in both old and new markets, and revenue from those consumers who reveal their identities, respectively. The optimal investment level K is the one that maximizes π K (λ, c). Similarly, the expected consumer surplus from investing K is given by
and the total welfare
The model becomes analytically intractable under general α K,γ . Thus, we study the impacts of model parameters, as well as data requirements, on the equilibrium through extensive numerical analysis below.
Numerical Analysis
Figure 4 shows how the optimal investment level K, the fraction of consumers choosing to reveal their identities γ, and the price for anonymous consumers p * (ṽ) are affected by parameters c and λ. Interestingly, Figure 4 (a) indicates that the firm's optimal investment level K is generally not monotone in either λ or c. However, when λ is sufficiently large (i.e., λ = 0.7 or λ = 0.9 in the figure) , the optimal investment level K decreases in c. Similarly, when c is sufficiently large (c ≥ 0.4 in the figure) , the optimal investment level also decreases in λ. This is consistent with our findings summarized in Corollary 1. Indeed, the monotonicity of K under the special case is conditional on the decision that the firm makes an investment, and the firm is shown to be more likely to invest with either a higher c or a higher λ by Corollary 2. When either c or λ is small, the monotonicity of K no longer holds. Figure 4 (a) suggests that K first increases in c, and then decreases after a certain point for small λ. To understand this result, it is crucial to connect it with the endogenous decisions of consumers who can conceal their identities (see Figure 4(b) ). When c is small, it is almost costless for consumers to conceal, and most consumers would indeed choose to conceal should the firm decide to invest. Coupled with the fact that the old market is not large, the optimal investment from the firm would be small. On the other end of the spectrum, when c is large, consumers have less flexibility in concealing their identities, and thus a small investment would be sufficient to extract all the benefits from profiling consumers. Small investments thus arise when it is either very easy or very difficult for consumers to protect their information. For intermediate values, the firm instead wants to invest more in the profiling technology, and thus the firm's investment is typically the highest for moderate c when λ is small. The argument for the non-monotonicity of λ when c is small follows the same logic. When the old market is relatively small, the benefit of consumer profiling tends to be small, leading to a small investment level from the firm. However, when the old market is extremely large, a small investment is sufficient to guarantee that a good fraction of consumers would reveal their identities, allowing the firm to profile accurately. As such, the firm's optimal investment is the highest with a moderate-size old market (λ = 0.7). Figure 4 (c) shows that the optimal price for anonymous consumers decreases in both λ and c, which is a general property and a direct extension of the properties of p * (v o ) under the special case as given by Equation (4). Figure 5 illustrates the impact of c and λ on the firm's optimal profit π K (λ, c), consumer surplus CS K (λ, c), and social welfare SW K (λ, c). Consistent with Lemma 4, the firm's optimal profit π K (λ, c) always increases in c and λ. Again, the monotonicity result in Lemma 4 is conditional on the firm's decision to invest which is more likely to happen with either a higher c or a higher λ. 5(b) indicates that consumer surplus decreases in λ, which is consistent with our result in Lemma 4(ii). With a larger old market, consumer profiling always becomes more attractive to the firm as it can price discriminate a larger fraction of the market, leading to a higher profit and lower consumer surplus. On the other hand, consumer surplus generally decreases in c. However, this result does not always hold. When λ = 0.9, consumer surplus first decreases, and then increases in c (this may not be obvious in Figure 5 (b), simply due to scale). Indeed this convexity of consumer surplus in c is already present in Lemma 4(ii). Under the special case when α K,γ is a step function, social welfare is convex in both λ and c as shown in Lemma 4(iii). Its non-monotonicity in c still holds under the general scenario shown in Figure 5 (c), however the total welfare seems to increase in λ most of the time with the chosen parameter values. Total welfare typically reaches its maximum when privacy costs are extremely large (i.e., c = 0.5). This is because, in such case, consumers will avoid the expenditure of concealing their identity to protect their privacy, which is a pure wasteful activity in our model. Without protection, everyone in the old market gets profiled and output expands, which is positive for total efficiency. However, the downside is that all the consumer surplus in the old market is then appropriated by the firm, and therefore the distribution of total welfare among the parties is tilted heavily in favor of the firm. We now turn to a discussion of the implications of "big data" versus "small data". Figure 6 illustrates the impact of b and d on the optimal investment level K, firm's optimal profit π K (λ, c),
consumer surplus CS K (λ, c), and social welfare SW K (λ, c). Recall that a higher b (or a higher d when K < 1) indicates a scenario with higher data requirement, other things being equal. Figure   6 (a) suggests that the optimal investment K is not monotone in the level of data requirement.
When the data requirement is low, a small investment is sufficient for the firm to profile consumers with good accuracy, and thus the optimal investment from the firm tends to be small. As data requirement increases, the firm generally increases its investment level with the hope of more accurate signals from consumers. At the same time, the fraction of consumers who choose to reveal their identities decreases. Consequently, when the data requirement is sufficiently high, even a high investment would not allow the firm to profile consumers accurately due to the lack of the scale of data, leading the firm to scale back its optimal investment level.
Though K is not monotone in either b or d, Figure 6 (b) suggests that the firm's profit π K (λ, c) is monotonically decreasing in both b and d. That is, a higher data requirement is always detrimental to the firm's profitability, which is consistent with our result under the special case shown in Proposition 2(i). Similarly, consumer surplus CS K (λ, c) increases in both b and d as illustrated in Figure   6 (c), which is a direct extension of Proposition 2(ii). Since profits decrease and consumer surplus increases, it is not surprising that total welfare is not monotone in the level of data requirement, as shown in Figure 6 (d). Lastly, we seek to find out under what conditions the firm's investment will be socially optimal.
We expect the firm's investment to be generally suboptimal from a total welfare point of view, because the firm maximizes its profits without taking into account consumer surplus. The more interesting question we address here is the following: are efficiency concerns more acute in a "small data" or in a "big data" environment? In order to facilitate the comparison, we proceed as follows.
First, we construct a benchmark where a central planner determines the investment with the goal of maximizing the total welfare. We denote the central planner's investment level as K s . Once K s is decided, the model unfolds as discussed in our base model where the firm determines the price for anonymous consumers, as well as individual prices for each consumer who reveal his identity, and then consumers make their purchase decisions accordingly. Finally, we denote the difference in the investment levels from the firm and from the social planner as ∆K ≡ K − K s . This is a measure of relative (in)efficiency. A small ∆K implies that the private investment choice of the firm is aligned with social welfare. Conversely for large differences. The impact of data requirement on the efficiency of the firm's investment is illustrated in Figure   8 (b) and 8(c). In particular, we consider two scenarios, a scenario with moderate λ and c (λ = 0.5 and c = 0.2), and a scenario with high λ and c (λ = 0.9 and c = 0.4). Under moderate λ and c, the difference in the investments corresponding with higher data requirement, i.e., d = 0.7 or 0.9, is generally smaller than the difference under lower data requirement, i.e., d = 0.3 or 0.5. However, this relationship is reversed in the scenario with high λ and c. The numerical analysis provides evidence for Proposition 2(iii) under general α K,γ .
These welfare results can be read in two ways. When it is relatively easy (respectively, very costly) for consumers to protect their privacy, then higher data requirements (respectively, lower data requirements) cause less policy concerns. Alternatively, with lower data requirements (respectively, higher data requirements), the firm's investment decision is more likely aligned with the social welfare by making data protection very costly (respectively, relatively easy).
Conclusion
In this paper, we study data profiling in the context of price discrimination. Our main contribution to the literature is the novel focus on two endogenous and related decisions: the firm invests in the precision of the information it gets from consumers, while consumers can take costly actions to protect their privacy. We show that the firm's investment in profiling closely relates to the flexibility of consumers to conceal their identities as well as to data requirements.
We derive managerial implications on when, how and why a firm should invest in profiling technologies. A small investment is optimal when c is either very small or very large. The rationales behind them differ substantially. When c is small, consumers in the old market have greater flexibility in protecting themselves, rendering any profiling technology ineffective; whereas when c is large, it is costly for consumers to conceal their identities, and thus a small investment is already effective. The optimal investment level is typically the highest with intermediate values of c, when λ is moderate. A similar argument applies to λ, i.e., the size of the old market, as well. It is not beneficial for the firm to invest heavily either when the size of the old market is small, or when the size of old market is large and consumers give up their information quite easily. The firm needs to invest relatively more heavily to counteract consumers' reluctance to reveal their information when λ is moderate. On another note, the firm's profit always increases in c as consumers have less incentives to engage in costly privacy protection. The firm also makes a higher profit with a larger old market.
The firm's investment is not monotone in the level of data requirement either, where the investment is the greatest when data requirement is moderate. When the data requirement is low, a small investment is sufficient for the firm to get a sufficiently informative dataset. As the data requirement increases, the firm generally increases its investment level with the hope of getting more accurate signals from consumers. However, this argument does not hold universally. When the data threshold is extremely high, i.e., "big data", the firm optimally scales back its investment simply because investing in profiling becomes too onerous. Overall profits typically decrease with data requirements.
We also discuss the welfare implications of privacy policies and regulations. Consumers benefit from stricter data protections, because otherwise they are negatively affected from price discrimination. However, the impact of data protection on social welfare is not always obvious, as one needs to trade off several effects involving consumers' costly privacy protection as well as quantity allocations in both the old targeted market and the new anonymous market. Some of the numerical examples (thus we cannot claim generality of our claims) show that both consumer surplus and total welfare are maximized for minimal protection of consumers, i.e., the highest possible concealing cost in our model. This is because, with a high concealing cost, no consumer has an incentive to maintain anonymity (which is a pure cost in our model), and thus all of them will be profiled by the firm, leading to an expansion in the output due to perfect personalized pricing in the old market. However, arguably this policy is rather an extreme case with zero data protection.
We further analyze piecemeal interventions involving incremental changes to data protection, and we find that the impact of data protection on social welfare is much more nuanced as it depends crucially on the starting level of the intervention.
Social welfare is not monotonic in data requirements due to the tension between net profit that is declining in data requirements and consumer surplus which is increasing. This per se is not potentially relevant from a policy perspective because data requirements are related to progress made in data analytics, typically not something that a policy maker could interfere with. Instead, we tackle a more meaningful question by comparing whether private choices of the firm are more aligned with total welfare in the context with a small data requirement or a large data requirement.
We show that the answer to this question is closely linked to privacy costs. When it is easy for consumers to protect their data, private and social incentives are aligned when data analytics involve a large data requirement. On the other hand, when it is very costly for consumers to conceal their information, a small data requirement induces an investment on the firm's side that is very close to that would be chosen by a social planner. Of course, this conclusion impinges on the model's assumption of consumers having no preference for privacy per se. If they do, regimes with privacy and data protection should naturally arise more often from a policy perspective; however, our comparative statics are still expected to hold true. then any consumer with a lower valuation would also choose to reveal. Thus, there exists a cutof v such that all consumers in the old market with v >ṽ choose to conceal their identity, and all consumers with v <ṽ choose to reveal. The decision of the type-ṽ consumer depends on whether a positive utility can be derived from concealing his identity.
Given a cutoffṽ, the optimal price charged to those anonymous consumers in the old market is given by Equation (2), i.e., p
. The expected utility of the type-ṽ consumer from concealing his identity must be non-negative. Otherwise, due to the continuity of the function v − p * (ṽ) − c, the consumer just right to the type-ṽ consumer receives a negative utility from concealing his identity, and thus he is better-off revealing his identity. As a result, we haveṽ − p * (ṽ) − c ≥ 0, which is equivalent toṽ ≥ v o .
When the firm's investment level K is greater than or equal to K o , the minimal fraction of consumers revealing their identities that allows the firm to perfectly profile them is less than or equal to v o , i.e., v K ≤ v o . Consequently, any consumer with a valuation less than v o would choose to reveal his identity and receive a zero utility, and any consumer with a valuation greater than v o chooses to conceal, and receives a non-negative expected utility from concealing his identity.
The type-v o consumer is indifferent between the two options, and by our assumption, he chooses to reveal his identity.
When the firm's investment level K is less than K o , we first show that the cutoffṽ cannot be greater than v K . Ifṽ > v K , the type-ṽ consumer would receive a positive utility from concealing his identity, asṽ − p * (ṽ) − c > 0, and a zero utility from revealing his identity. Due to the continuity of function v − p * (ṽ) − c, the consumer just left to the type-ṽ consumer is also better-off concealing his utility, and thusṽ ≤ v K . Moreover, whenṽ = v K , the type-v K consumer is also better-off concealing his utility, as his utility from concealing is positive due to v K > v o , and his utility from revealing his identity is zero. To this end, we only need to show that any consumer with a valuation lower than v K would choose to reveal his identity. Ifṽ < v K , the firm's belief of a consumer's valuation who chooses to reveal his identity is given by 1/ṽ, ∀ v ∈ [0,ṽ]. The optimal price the firm charges to those consumers is given by arg max p p ṽ p 1 v dv =ṽ 2 . Consequently, the utility of the type-ṽ consumer from revealing his identity is given byṽ/2, and the utility from concealing his identity is given bỹ v − p * (ṽ) − c. It is easy to verify that v − p * (v) − c < v/2, ∀ v ∈ [0, v K ). Consequently, any consumer with a valuation lower than v K is better-off revealing his identity, and we thus obtain the announced result.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the following two scenarios: (1) K ≥ K o . From Equation (5), we know that the firm gains no more information advantage once its investment reaches the threshold Thus, the firm is better-off investing K o than any investment K o − , for any small > 0. On the other hand, when v K = 1, the firm's optimal profit is given by π 0 (λ, c) = 1/4, which is greater than the firm's optimal profit with an investment sufficiently close to τ (1), which is 1/4 − τ (1). Thus we obtain the announced result.
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Taking the derivative of π Ko (λ, c) with respect to c, we have ∂π Ko (λ, c) ∂c
where the inequality is due to γ ∈ [0, 1] and result (i) in Corollary 1. Similarly, taking the derivative of the profit function with respect to γ, we have ∂π Ko (λ, c) ∂λ
The first and second-order derivatives of CS Ko (λ, c) with respect to c are given by ∂CS Ko (λ, c) ∂c = λc − λ + λ(2λ − 3)(λc − 1) (λ − 2) 2 , ∂ 2 CS Ko (λ, c) ∂c 2 = λ(3λ − 4)(λ − 1) (λ − 2) 2 ≥ 0, where the inequality is due to λ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, CS Ko (λ, c) is convex in c.
(iii) The first and second-order derivatives of SW Ko (λ, c) with respect to c are given by
Given that λ ∈ [0, 1], τ (·) is concave, and ∂ 2 v o /∂c 2 = 0, ∂ 2 SW Ko (λ, c)/∂c 2 is guaranteed to be greater than or equal to 0. Consequently, SW Ko (λ, c) is convex in c.
Similarly, the second-order derivative of SW Ko (λ, c) with respect to λ is given by
The first inequality is due to λ ∈ [0, 1], and −20c 2 + 8c + 1 = (1 − 2c)(1 + 10c) ≥ 0 because of c ∈ [0, 1/2]. The second inequality is due to c ∈ [0, 1/2], λ ∈ [0, 1], and τ (·) is non-increasing and concave. We thus obtain the announced result.
Proof of Corollary 3. (i) From Corollary 2, we know that ∂CS Ko (λ, c)/∂λ < 0, and CS Ko (λ, c)
is maximized at λ = 0, where it attains a value of 1/8. Recall that CS 0 (λ, c) = 1/8. We thus have CS Ko (λ, c) ≤ CS 0 (λ, c) for any λ and c.
(ii) We seek to establish the inequality by showing that SW Ko (λ, c) ≥ SW 0 (λ, c) for any λ ≥ 1/4 when K o = 0, i.e., the function τ (·) is extremely small irrespective of λ and c. Recall that we show in Lemma 4(iii) that SW Ko (λ, c) is a convex function in c. This result remains valid when K o = 0, and its minimum is realized at ∂SW Ko (λ, c)/∂c = 0, i.e., c * (λ) = 1−λ 8−5λ
. Plugging c * (λ) into SW Ko (λ, c),
we have SW Ko (λ, c * (λ)) = λ 2 −4λ+6 2(8−5λ)
. The second-order derivative of SW Ko (λ, c * (λ)) is given by
where the inequality is due to λ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, SW Ko (λ, c * (λ)) is convex in λ. The two roots such that SW Ko (λ, c * (λ)) = SW 0 (λ, c) = 3/8 are given by λ 1 = 0 and λ 2 = 1/4. Consequently, SW Ko (λ, c) ≥ 3/8 for any λ ≥ 1/4 when K o = 0, and we obtain the announced result.
